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n; THE SuPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. CASE NOS. 16023, 16221 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, (CONSOLIDATED) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ON BOTH CONSOLIDATED APPEALS 
* * * * * * * 
STATEViliNT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment that defendant 
Edward Gillmor is not entitled to a two-year renewal of three 
leases on real property located in Summit, Tooele and Salt Lake 
Counties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Partial Summary Judgment 
The trial court entered partial summary judgment in this 
action on July 25, 1978, aeclaring that defendant was not 
entitled to renew the two leases on the Tooele and Summit 
County properties. The trial court denied summary judgment on 
the Salt Lake County lease on the grounds that possible triable 
issues of fact remained for resolution on that lease. The 
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effect of the court's partial summary judgment order was to 
terminate the Tooele and Summit County leases between plaintiff 
and defendant on December 31, 1978. Case No. 16023 is an 
appeal by defendant from that order. 
Disposition at Trial 
Trial on the issues remaining for resolution on the Salt 
Lake County lease occurred on November 6, 1978, and following 
that trial the court entered findings and conclusions and 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, ruling that the Salt Lake 
County lease, like the other two leases, would terminate on 
December 31, 1978 with no right of renewal (R. 180-81). The 
trial court also independently concurred with the law and 
motion judge's findings on the earlier partial summary judgment 
(R. 180). Case No. 16221 is an appeal from the final judgment 
in this case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff submits that both judges below properly ruled in 
her favor and that both the partial summary judgment order and 
the final judgment should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts before the court below in 
the summary judgment motion 
Since 1970 the plaintiff and defendant have been tenants 
in common of some 32,000 acres of land located in Salt Lake, 
-2-
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Tooele and Summit Counties (R. 2). Plaintiff has a one-half 
interest in those properties, defendant has a one-quarter 
interest, and another relative, Charles Frank Gillmor, who is 
not a party to this action, owns the remaining one-quarter 
interest in those properties (R. 17). 
At the time this action was instituted, the Gillmor 
properties had been partitioned in kind among the three co-
tenants (R. 13). At that time, each party was the owner of 
undivided fee interests in the Gillmor lands (descriptions of 
the properties awarded to each co-tenant are attached to 
plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit "B") 1 (R. 13,16). 
In 1969, Edward Lincoln Gillmor, the father of plaintiff 
Florence Gillmor, leased his one-half interest in all the 
Gillmor livestock properties to the defendant and to Stephen T. 
Gillmor, leases which are attached to the complaint as Exhibits 
"C", "D" and "E 11 (R. 45-61). In 1970, Edward Lincoln Gillmor 
died and plaintiff, his daughter, succeeded to his one-half 
interest in the Gillmor properties, subject to the three leases 
(R. 119,116). Stephen T. Gillmor later assigned all his right, 
title and interest in those leases to defendant in 1972, and he 
no longer has any interest in the properties at issue here. 
( R. 3 at ~~ 4 , R. 6 7 at ~I 4 ) . 
1 Following entry of both partial summary judgment and final 
judgment in this case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled on the 
partition appeal and remanded that case for further proceed-
ings, so the parties are tenants in common again at the present 
time, a matter further discussed infra at 22-23. Gillmor v. 
Gillmor, Case No. 15457 (Utah March 23, 1979). That appeal had 
not been resolved prior to disposition of the case at bar, 
however, so it is not discussed in this section of the brief. 
-3-
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Each of the three leases is for an identical ten year term 
and contains nearly identical provisions throughout. The only 
significant variance between them is each lease's description 
of property subject to the lease, as each is for property in 
different counties. The sole provision on which this suit 
turns is the following option to renew, which also appears in 
each lease: 
The Lessees have the option to extend 
this lease for a period of two years 
upon the expiration of this lease, 
provided the ownership of this property 
is vested in the present Lessor. 
[R. 51,56,57,60; emphasis added]. 
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she is the 
successor in interest to the original lessor, Edward Lincoln 
Gillmor, who died in 1970 and that each of the leases was due 
to expire on November 15, 1978. She prayed for a declaratory 
judgment that the defendant was not entitled to a two-year 
renewal of the leases under the above-quoted provision because 
the "present Lessor" referred to therein was clearly a refer-
ence to her father, and since the property was no longer vested 
in that "present Lessor," the defendant was not entitled to 
renew any of the leases (R. 2-4). 
Defendant denied in his answer that plaintiff was the 
successor in interest to her father and denied that the leases 
were to expire on November 15, 1978 (R. 68). 
-4-
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Plaintiff thereafter brought the motion for summary judg-
ment here appealed from, asserting in her supporting memorandum 
that the language of each lease was clear and unambiguous, that 
there were no material issues of fact, and that she was there-
fore entitled to summary judgment. To obviate defendant's 
denial in his answer that the plaintiff is her father's 
successor in interest to the subject properties, she attached 
as Exhibit "A" to that memorandum a copy of defendant's reply 
to her counterclaim in the partition action, which admits 
(l) that Florence Gillmor is in fact the owner of an undivided 
interest in the subject property, and (2) that the Gillmor 
property was leased by her father to defendant (R. 116,119) 
by virtue of the same leases which are at issue in the case at 
bar. 
As to defendant's denial that the three leases were to 
terminate on November 15, 1978, plaintiff obviated that 
question of fact by stipulating, for purposes of the motion 
for summary judgment, that the leases should terminate on 
December 31, 1978 rather than on November 15th. As each lease 
states in its opening paragraph that the term of the lease is 
from "1969 to 1978 . . inclusive," that stipulation negated 
any remaining issues of fact before the court. 
The parties submitted prehearing and posthearing memoranda 
(R. 73,86,101) supporting their respective positions and the 
-5-
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trial court heard oral arguments on plaintiff's motion. 
Following submission of all briefs and the oral argument, the 
court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as 
prayed for in her complaint as to the Tooele and Summit County 
leases, but denied summary judgment on the Salt Lake County 
lease because of a possible triable issue of fact. 2 
At that point, defendant filed his appeal in Case 16023, 
contesting the trial court's granting of partial summary judg-
ment on the Tooele and Summit County leases. 
Facts presented at trial 
Plaintiff asserted at trial that the Salt Lake County 
lease, like the other two leases, was clear and unambiguous and 
that the reference in that lease to the ''present leasor,' like 
the other two leases, was clearly a reference to her father 
only (R. 293-94). Because her father had died in 1970, plaintiff 
argued, defendant was not entitled to renew that lease, as the 
lease provides for right of renewal only if ownership of the 
subject property "is vested in the present Lessor" (R. 255) . 
Defendant sought to prove at trial {1) that the renewal 
provision in the lease is ambiguous and therefore that evidence 
of surrounding circumstances should be introduced; and (2) that 
the present leases are nearly identical to leases executed 1n 
2 
The only distinction between the Salt Lake lease and the other 
two leases is that plaintiff Florence Gillmor joined in the 1969 
lease in Salt Lake County in order to lease 40 acres of real pro-
perty which she owned at that time. She did not, however, have 
any interest at that time in any properties in the other two 
counties and is nowhere identified as a party to those two leases. 
-6-
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1953 and in 1957 between defendant and plaintiff's father 
(R. 270,281). 
While defendant asserts in his statement of facts (final 
judgment appeal brief at 5) that the trial court excluded 
evidence of surrounding circumstances in 1969, when these 
leases were executed, that assertion is wholly inaccurate. It 
is true that plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of surround-
ing circumstances, but the trial court sustained no objections 
by plaintiff's counsel to such evidence. Plaintiff introduced 
little evidence on those surrounding circunstances, not because 
of any rulings by the court below, but only because none of the 
parties were able to recall those circumstances in response to 
questions by defense counsel. 
Plaintiff presented the following unrebutted evidence at 
the trial. First, Stephen T. Gillmor, defendant's partner at 
the time these leases were executed (R. 258) , iden~ified the 
Salt Lake County lease and stated that Mr. Skeen, defendant's 
counsel herein, had drafted that lease (R. 258,260). He had no 
recollection of any of the negotiations at that time concerning 
the renewal option in that lease (R. 259) . 
The plaintiff then testified that Edward Lincoln Gillmor, 
described as the lessor in the Salt Lake County Lease (and the 
other two leases), was her father, and that he had died in 1970 
(R. 262), at which time she succeeded to his entire interest in 
the Gillmor properties as the sole heir under his will (R. 265). 
-7-
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Unlike the other two leases, plaintiff did sign the Salt 
Lake County lease, and she testified that the only reason she 
was a party to that lease was because she owned 40 acres of 
property in Salt Lake County in 1969, which were leased to 
defendant along with the other 7,000 acres of property desig-
nated in that lease. She had no interest whatsoever in those 
other 7, 000 acres in 1969 (R. 263-64). She further testified 
that, with the sole exception of that 40 acre parcel in Salt 
Lake County, she had no interest in 1969 in any of the pro-
perties identified in any of the three leases at issue herein 
(R. 264). 
Plaintiff rested her case following that testimony and 
defendant then took the stand. He testified that he first 
leased the half interest of plaintiff's father in the Gillmor 
properties in 1953 (R. 268), and that a new lease was executed 
with plaintiff's father in 1957 when Steve Gillmor joined 
defendant's livestock business (R.269). Defendant testified 
that he had been unable to locate the 1957 lease (R. 269,280) 
Defendant's counsel then asked him about the terms of that 1957 
lease (R. 270). The court overruled plaintiff's objection, to 
that question and defendant then testified that he believed the 
terms of the 1969 lease to be essentially similar to those of 
the 1957 lease (R. 272). 
-8-
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On the other hand, defendant recalled no discussions at 
any time with plaintiff's father, with plaintiff herself, or 
with anyone else regarding the renewal provisions at issue 
herein (R. 273, 285-86). 
Despite defendant's assertions to the contrary in his 
brief on appeal, the only objection ultimately sustained by the 
trial court to any question during the trial was to a rather 
leading and ambiguous inquiry by plaintiff's counsel as to 
whether defendant is now the only member of the Gillmor family 
still active in the livestock business (R. 277). That objection 
was based, not on the grounds that the lease is clear and 
unambiguous, as defendant asserts in his brief, but on grounds 
of relevancy (id.). And the objection was clearly sustained, 
not because all evidence of surrounding circumstances was to be 
excluded, but only because of the irrelevance of that particular 
inquiry (R. 278) . As evidence by both parties prior to that 
question had established that defendant was not the only 
Gillmor family member involved in the livestock business in 
1969, when the leases were executed, that objection to rele-
vance was clearly well-taken, because the number of Gillmors 
currently involved in the livestock business has no bearing on 
surrounding circumstances in 1969, which defendant was attempting 
to establish (R. 258,273). 
Because the trial court did allow testimony by defendant 
on predecessor leases and surrounding circumstances when those 
-9-
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leases were executed, plaintiff proceeded to test defendant's 
recollection of negotiations for those leases and of their 
terms. That cross examination established that defendant had 
very little recollection of the terms of those prior leases, 
and that what recollection he did have was largely inaccurate. 
Defendant asserted initially in cross examination that, 
with the exception of different rental provisions, the 1953 and 
1969 leases were "very similar" (R. 281). The 1953 lease was 
then introduced into evidence and a few of its material pro-
visions were compared with the 1969 lease (R. 283-85). While 
the 1969 lease has a ten-year term with a two-year renewal 
option, the 1953 lease had a one-year term with a one-year 
renewal option (R. 283). While the 1969 lease covers real 
property only, the 1953 lease covered both real and personal 
property (R. 284). After review of those leases, defendant 
eventually admitted that a number of material provisions in the 
1953 and 1969 leases were entirely different (R. 285). 
Of particular importance in this action, defendant also 
acknowledged that there is no reference to a "present lessor" 
in the 1953 lease (R. 285), and he did not believe that essen-
tially the same renewal option was carried forward from 1953 to 
1957 and finally into the 1969 lease (R. 282). While defendant 
initially asserted that the 1953, 1957 and 1969 leases were all 
very similar, it eventually became clear that he has not been 
able to find the 1957 lease, that his recollection of the terms 
-10-
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of ~he 1953 lease was extremely inaccurate, that the 1953 and 
1969 leases were vastly different, and that he recalled none of 
the negotiations which preceded execution of any of those 
leases. 
Plaintiff called Stephen Gillmor back to the stand as a 
rebuttal witness after defendant rested his case. Steve Gillmor 
testified that, to the best of his recollection, the 1957 lease 
was for a one-year term, which was renewed orally from year to 
year thereafter until 1969 (R. 291). That testimony was re-
inforced by references to the 1957 lease in a draft lease 
extension agreement, drawn up in 1969 but never executed by the 
parties (R. 290-91). Steve Gillmor testified that, unlike the 
1969 leases at issue herein, the 1957 lease did not have a ten-
year term, and he recalled no reference in the 1957 lease's 
renewal option to a "present lessor" (R. 292). In other words, 
plaintiff also established, despite plaintiff's initial un-
supported assertions to the contrary, that the 1957 and 1969 
leases were as dissimilar as the 1953 and 1969 leases. 
Following the trial, the court below ruled in favor of 
plaintiff, finding that: 
l. Plaintiff has an ownership interest in the properties 
described in the three leases, and defendant is a lessee of 
plaintiff's interest in those properties. 
2. The material provisions of the three leases are 
identical except for the fact that (a) the property described 
-11-
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in each lease is in different counties, and (b) plaintiff is a 
party to the Salt Lake County lease only. 
3. Each of the three leases expires on December 31, 
1978. 
4. The individual identified as the 'present lessor' in 
each of the three leases is plaintiff's father, Edward Lincoln 
Gillmor, who died in 1970. 
5. Plaintiff is her father's successor in interest to 
those properties. 
6. The renewal option in all three leases is identical, 
provides that the lease may be renewed only if the subject 
property is still vested in the "present lessor," and is clear 
and unambiguous. 
7. The only "present lessor" designated in any of the 
three leases is plaintiff's father, and plaintiff is not a 
"present lessor" within the meaning of any lease. 
8. When the present leases were executed, plaintiff's 
only interest in any of the subject properties was in a 40 acre 
parcel identified in her name at page 6 of the Salt Lake County 
lease. 
9. The trial court independently concurred in the partial 
summary judgment previously entered by Judge Winder and ruled 
that defendant may not exercise the renewal option set forth in 
any of the three leases (R. 177-182). 
-12-
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Defendant then filed his appeal in Case 16221, contesting 
the trial court's entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
The first two arguments herein are pertinent both to the 
partial summary judgment and to the final judgment orders. The 
third argument pertains only to the summary judgment order, and 
the last two arguments are pertinent only to the appeal from the 
final judgment in this case. 
POINT I 
BOTH SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
WERE PROPERLY ENTERED IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR 
BECAUSE THE RENEWAL PROVISION IN ALL THREE LEASES 
WAS A COVE~ANT PERSONAL TO EDWAPn LINCOLN GILLMOR, 
PLAINTIFF'S FATHER. 
Plaintiff argued both in her motion for summary judgment and 
at trial that the clear and unambiguous language of all three 
leases created a renewal covenant which was personal to plain-
tiff's father, which did not run with the land, and that 
defendant therefore must be precluded from exercising the 
renewal option because plaintiff's father no longer owns the 
subject property. Defendant argued, on the other hand, that 
the renewal options are ambiguous, a contention which both the 
law and motion judge and the trial judge properly rejected. 
The language in question in all three leases is identical; 
each renewal option provides: 
-13-
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The Lessees have the option to extend this 
lease for a period of two years upon ~he 
expiration of this lease, provided the owner-
ship of this property is vested in the present 
Lessor. [Emphasis added]. 
The Tooele and Summit County leases make no reference 
whatsoever to plaintiff Florence Gillmor, and the "present 
Lessor" referred to in those leases is clearly a reference to 
Edward Lincoln Gillmor, plaintiff's father, who executed both 
leases as lessor. 
The Salt Lake County lease varies slightly from the other 
two leases because plaintiff Florence Gillmor did sign that 
lease, in her capacity as an owner of one 40 acre parcel (ou~ 
of more than 7,000 acres subject to that lease). That lease, 
however, is in all essential respects identical to the other 
two leases, with the sole exception of the reference to one 
piece of property owned by plaintiff at that time, and it is 
obvious that all three leases were drafted at the same time 
from one model. 
For example, the very first page of the Salt Lake County 
lease identifies only Edward Lincoln Gillmor as a lessor 
(R. 293). At page 5 of that lease, the text provides that "the 
above Lessor and his daughter, Florence J. Gillmor, do hereby 
lease and let . . their full interest in" an additional 80 
acres of land, 40 acres which were then owned by plaintiff's 
father and 40 acres which were owned by plaintiff (R. 294). 
The remainder of the lease consistently refers to the "Lessor" 
-14-
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ln the singular, not in the plural (id.). '"'he only reference 
in that entire lease to "Lessors" in the plural is on the last 
page, immediately preceding the signatures of plaintiff and her 
father (R. 295). 
It was proper for the trial court to construe the three 
leases together, because they were executed at the time, 
between the same parties, and as part of the same transaction. 
Cassel v. Anderson, 507 P.2d 444, 446 (N.M. 1973); 51 C.J.S. 
Landlord & Tenant, §232(13). As plaintiff was not a party to 
the Tooele and Summit leases, this construction reaffirms a 
conclusion that the "present lessor" in all three leases was 
her father. 
Both in the summary judgment notion and at trial, it was 
plaintiff's position that all three leases are clear and 
unambiguous, that the intent of the parties can easily be 
ascertained from the documents themselves, and that there was 
therefore no reason for the court below to take evidence on 
surrounding circumstances at the time the parties entered into 
these agreements. It is well settled that the construction and 
interpretation of a lease unambiguous in its terms is a question 
of law for the court. The intention of the parties and the 
meaning of the lease are to be deduced from the plain, general 
and common meaning of those terms. E.g., Commercial Building 
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776 (Utah 1977); Ephraim Theatre Co. 
v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). 
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The plain and unambiguous language of the leases here in 
question demonstrates that the extension option was intended by 
the parties to be contingent upon the satisfaction of an 
express condition precedent, i.e., that ownership of the 
premises be vested in 1978 (the normal lease expiration date) 
in Edward Lincoln Gillmor, plaintiff's father. Because the 
intention of the parties is readily ascertained from the face 
of those leases, no othe= rules of construction should have 
been or were invoked to interpret the Tooele and Summit County 
leases. Western Devel. Corp. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 
452 (1955). For that matter, plaintiff still asserts that the 
parties' intention ~as also just as easily ascertained from the 
face of the Salt Lake County lease, although the trial court 
did in fact allow evidence on surrounding circumstances at 
trial. 
Defendant also asserted, both in the summary judgment pro-
ceedings and at trial, that several provisions in the leases 
are ambiguous because they may be interdependent (e.g., 
R. 229-30). The thrust of plaintiff's argument on this issue 
is that the renewal option in each lease must be construed in 
conjunction with a separate provision in each lease which 
grants the lessee a first option to purchase the property under 
specified circumstances (id.). Both judges in the court below, 
however, properly disregarded that argument, as it is also well 
-16-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
settled that lease covenants will be construed as independent 
unless they are expressly made dependent, which is not the case 
with these leases. 6 Williston on Contracts, §890 at 588-89 
(3d ed.); Enos v. Foster, 317 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. App. 1958), 
citing Restatement of Contracts, §290; Thompson v. Harris, 
452 P.2d 122, 126 (Ariz. App. 1969), citing Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, §290. As defendant was unable to recall any 
evidence at trial which might support his argument on this 
issue, the trial court also correctly rejected his assertion on 
the independent grounds of his failure of proof. 
As to the Salt Lake County lease, it expressly refers in 
several places to the "lessor" in the singular, refers in one 
place to the "lessor and his daughter," and refers only above 
the signature lines to "lessors" in the plural. Because of its 
multiple references to the lessor in the singular, a strong 
inference is created that "the present Lessor" of the Salt Lake 
lease is plaintiff's father, and not plaintiff herself. In 
Geyer v. Lietzan, 102 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. 1952), the Indiana 
Supreme Court held that a lease for two years which expressly 
referred in some places to the "lessee and his heirs," but 
which referred only to "the lessee" in the renewal clause was 
to be construed as conferring a renewal right personal only to 
the named lessee and not available to his heirs or assigns. 
The court stated: 
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Here the initial term is granted to "Ira 
B. Geyer, and to his heirs, assigns, 
executors and administrators," but when 
we come to the renewal clause the privilege 
is extended to the lessee only. His heirs, 
assigns, etc. are not mentioned. It is not 
necessary to a covenant running with the land 
that the words heirs, assigns, etc. be used, 
but the use, the manner of use, or the failure 
to use those words may be most important to 
the discovery of the intention of the parties. 
The inclusion of those words in one place, and 
their omission in another, may be most signi-
ficant. Considering this, and much of 
the other language of the lease which we 
will not pause to point out, it seems to 
us that the right to renew the lease was 
not extended to those in privity with the 
lessee, but instead was personal to him. 
As in ~. plaintiff asserted in the court below that 
the consistent reference in all three leases, including the 
Salt Lake County lease, to the ''lessor" in the singular, and 
the identification of the lessor on the first page of each 
lease as Edward Lincoln Gillmor, create a strong inference that 
plaintiff's father was the only intended "present lessor," so 
the renewal option was a personal covenant dependent on whether 
plaintiff's father survived to the expiration of the normal 
lease term. 
The holdings by both judges below that this renewal option 
was a covenant personal to Edward Lincoln Gillmor and that this 
covenant does not run with the land are also amply supported by 
prior decisions of this Court. Defendant argues in his brief 
on the sununary judgment appeal (at 6-7) that covenants to renew 
leases always run with the land. This argument overlooks both 
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the clear language of the leases themselves and Utah law on 
this issue. Defendant cites no Utah decisions in support of 
his contention, an omission doubtless the result of the fact 
that Utah law is directly contrary to his position. 
This Court has clearly stated that before a covenant will 
run with the land it must appear, "either in the express words, 
or in the nature of the transaction and the covenant, that it 
was intended by the parties to run to subsequent transferees.'' 
First Western Fidelitv v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27 Utah 2d 1, 4, 
492 P.2d 132, 134 (1971). The Court in that case further noted 
that a covenant runs with the land only if it meets both the 
requirement of intent and if it would have "some permanent 
effect of a physical nature upon the land itself affecting its 
usefulness and/or its value" (emphasis supplied). 
It is clear that the extension provisions in this case 
have no "permanent effect of a physical nature" upon the land. 
Neither of the conditions necessary for a covenant to run with 
the land is present in this case. Regardless of the position 
adopted in other jurisdictions, the law in Utah is clear: the 
extension provisions in these leases do not run with the land 
and are therefore terminated. 
The position expressed in the First Western decision is 
consonant with the general principle, applied in construing 
contracts as well as in construing covenants, that courts should 
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give effect to the intention of the parties as evidenced by the 
plain meaning of their agreement: 
The rule of construction which obtains with 
regard to express covenants in leases 
requires them to be interpreted according 
to the obvious intention of the parties as 
collected from the whole context of the 
instrument and in consonance with the 
reasonable sense of the words employed. 
[Citations omitted]. 
-- Fuchs v. Goe, 163 P.2d 783, 793 
(Wyo. 1945). 
In this case, the extension option in each of the leases 
provides that the lessee may exercise that option only if 
''ownership of this property is vested in the present Lessor." 
In all three leases at issue herein, Edward Lincoln Gillmor, 
plaintiff's father, was the sole "present Lessor." Accordingly, 
it is beyond dispute that when plaintiff's father died the 
defendant irretrievably lost the right to renew these leases. 
The intention of the parties could not have been more clearly 
expressed. 
For the foregoing reasons, both judges in the trial court 
correctly ruled that these leases should be terminated on 
December 31, 1978, and that defendant could not exercise the 
renewal options in those leases. 
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POINT II 
DECLAP~TORY JUDG~lliNT WAS 
APPROPRIATELY ENTERED 
IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant asserts in both his briefs on appeal (1) that 
this case was not ripe for judgment, and (2) that judgment was 
inappropriate because of "ongoing activities which may change 
the factual situation." Defendant's summary judgment brief at 
4-6; final judgment brief at 10-11. Neither argument has 
merit. 
The issues presented to the trial court were fully ripe 
for adjudication. The leases in question were to expire within 
eight months of defendant's motion for summary judgment, and 
within two months follov1ing trial, hardly a remote time frame. 
Those leases have now all expired. Had those leases already 
expired before commencement of suit, plaintiff's action would 
have been for unlawful detainer rather than for declaratory 
judgment. 
The purpose of declaratory judgment is "to settle and 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to 
rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liber-
ally construed and administered." Section 78-33-12, Utah Code 
Ann . ( 19 53 ) . Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act is fairly 
interpreted as a vehicle for determining rights between parties 
once a justiciable controversy arises but before either party 
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has acted to cause injury to the other. Such an interpretation 
was recently approved by this Court in Salt Lake County v. 
Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1977). 
In that case the County sought a declaratory judgment to 
determine, inter alia, whether the City could terminate the 
County's water supply. In discussing the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, the Court explained: 
The purpose of the creation of the declara-
tory judgment procedure was to avoid the 
difficulties of the common-law rule that 
rights would not be adjudicated by a court 
unless there had been a violation for which 
relief could be granted; and to provide a 
means for resolving uncertainties and 
controversies before trouble has developed 
or harm has occurred and in order to avoid 
future litigation. 
In its answer the City asserted that it was under no obligation 
to furnish water to the County, and that even if it were under 
such an obligation, there had as yet been no decrease or termina-
tion of the water supply and therefore no injury to the County. 
Thus, the City reasoned, there was no present controversy to 
justify declaratory judgment. 
This Court rejected the City's argument and ruled that a 
declaratory judgment was proper "to relieve uncertainty and 
insecurity and to avoid possible controversy and harm." 570 
P.2d at 121. To the same effect is Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 
434, 228 P.2d 818, 820 (1951) (purpose of declaratory judgment 
is to "stabilize uncertain legal relations"). A..'1d see Parker 
v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848, 851 (1972) (purpose 
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is "to provide a means for securing adjudication without the 
necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into 
serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights 
determined in court"). 
As plaintiff argued to the court below, she would be 
materially harmed if the court had ruled that this case was not 
ripe for adjudication. First, her property would be occupied 
unlawfully if the defendant were to remain on the land after 
the end of the year. Second, she would be prevented from re-
leasing the property at a higher rental which would more closely 
approximate the fair rental value of those propertles in today's 
market. The court's determination that the case was ripe for 
adjudication was an adoption of a salutary judicial policy, 
allowing a lessor to arrange for a subsequent tenancy and to 
minimize the time when his or her land is unoccupied. 
Utah law further provides that "a contract may be construed 
either before or after there has been a breach thereof." 
Section 78-33-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (emphasis supplied). 
That statutory provision, construed in conjunction with the 
Declaratory Judgment Act mandate that the Act should be 
"liberally construed and administeren," clearly reaffirms the 
two decisions below to grant declaratory judgment on the 
extension provision in the leases. Other state courts have 
similarly found that covenants associated with real property 
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may properly be construed through declaratory judgment. E.g., 
Marra v. Aetna Construction Co., 101 P.2d 490 (Calif. 1940). 
Defendant's second assertion of error, i.e., that summary 
judgment should not have been granted because of ongoing facts 
which might change the relationship of the parties, is simi-
larly devoid of merit. The "ongoing facts" to which defendant 
refers are, of course, the respective ownership positions of 
the parties arising out of the partition action on which this 
Court recently ruled. 
In the partition suit, this plaintiff and defendant pre-
sented opposing theories of the best manner in which to parti-
tion the subject properties, and the court below ruled that 
plaintiff's theory of partition should govern the trial. The 
parties proceeded to put on evidence at trial on their theories 
of partition, reserving until a later date questions of the 
proper allocation of appurtenant rights among the parties. 
Following that first phase of the trial, the partition appeal 
was taken by this defendant. This Court ruled that the trial 
court's judgment on that first phase should be reversed and 
remanded because the case had only been "half tried'' by the 
time it went up on appeal. The Court noted that further evi-
dence should be presented at trial to ensure that the trial 
court gives "due consideration" to "the interests, the con-
tentions and demands of the parties." Gillmor v. Gillmor, Case 
No. 15457 (Utah March 23, 1979). 
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In other words, while the partition judgment of the court 
below was in effect at the time of trial of the case at bar, 
and the parties were at that time owners in severalty of the 
Gillmor properties, the parties have recently been returned to 
their status as tenants in common of those properties, by 
virtue of this Court's vacating the partition judgment. Plain-
tiff argued in both phases of the case at bar, however, and 
reiterates now that the outcome of that partition suit is 
wholly irrelevant to a determination of the propriety of enter-
ing a declaratory judgment on these leases. The simple fact of 
the matter is that, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 
partition suit, the case at bar simply operated to terminate 
whatever leasehold interest the defendant might otherwise be 
entitled to by virtue of his leases from the plaintiff's father. 
That question is one which is entirely separate from the issues 
raised in the partition proceeding, which are concerned only 
with (1) the rights of tenants in common inter se, a separate 
issue from their rights as lessees; and (2) defendant's ulti-
mate rights to use and occupy parcels of land formerly occupied 
by him as a tenant in common but ultimately to be awarded in 
severalty as a result of partition. As the rights of lessees 
to occupy and use land are governed by entirely separate law 
from the rights to co-tenants to use and occupy land, the 
partition suit has no impact upon this case. 
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Defendant simply stated below, and again urges on this 
appeal, that the partition case should have been considered by 
the court below "in view of the silence of the lease as to the 
effect thereon of partition." Defendant's summary judgment 
brief at 5; final judgment brief at 11. The law is well 
established, however, that (1) a lease by less than all co-
tenants is not a bar to partition, and (2) after partition in 
kind, any lessee will simply be entitled to apply whatever 
leasehold interest he has to any portion of the common property 
which is assigned to his lessor. 
In support of the principle that the existence of a lease 
joined in by only part of the co-tenants does not bar partition 
in kind are, ~· Roberts v. Burnett, 137 S.E. 773 (Ga. 1927); 
Thomas v. Farr, 44 N.E.2d 434 (Ill. 1942); Jackson v. O'Rorke, 
98 N.W. 1068 (Neb. 1904). 
Cases stating the principle that any lessee will be 
entitled to apply his lease to whatever area of the common 
property is assigned to his lessor after partition include 
Trowbridoe v. Donner, 40 K.h'.2d 655 (Neb. 1950), and Phillips 
v. Dulany, 77 S.E. 449 (Va. 1913). Shares of the common 
property alloted to co-ov.'Tiers who did not join in the lease 
will be taken free of the lease. ~. Trowbridge v. Donner, 
supra; Nelson v. Wentworth, 138 N.E. 917 (Mass. 1923). 
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In summary, then, as plaintiff urged to the court below, 
this case was in fact ripe for declaratory judgment, and the 
outcome of the appeal on the partition action was and still is 
irrelevant to a determination of whether the leases could be 
terminated. Since the leases between plaintiff's father and 
the defendant covered the entirety of the common property held 
by each of them, the effect of this declaratory judgment is 
simply to preclude the defendant from claiming any leasehold 
interest in any of those subject properties which are 
eventually awarded to the plaintiff. For that reason, the 
trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
SUMMARY JUDGHEI\T WAS PROPERLY 
ENTERED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO 
HATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT. 
Defendant argues, citing numerous authorities, the well-
settled proposition that summary judgment is precluded where 
there are material issues of fact remaining for resolution 
betv1een the parties (Defendant's summary judgment brief at 7-9). 
The only reference which defendant makes in that brief, how-
ever, to any such alleged issues of fact is the following: 
In this case there is no evidence of facts 
or circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the lease and the court should not permit 
the drastic procedure of summary judgment 
to be substituted for a trial. 
Id. at 8. 
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The only other issues of fact raised at all by defendant 
on the summary judgment appeal concern the expiration date of 
the leases and whether or not Florence Gillmor was in fact her 
father's successor in interest. As noted in the preceding 
discussion of facts, however, both those issues were dissipated 
prior to hearing on plaintiff's motion. The first issue was 
obviated by stipulation, and the second issue was countered by 
the defendant's own express admission in his pleadings in the 
partition action that Florence Gillmor is her father's successor 
in interest to the Gillmor livestock properties. 
Accordingly, there were no material issues of fact which 
could have precluded summary judgment in this case, and the 
trial court correctly granted plaintiff's motion. In addition, 
even if this Court concludes that it was error to grant plain-
tiff's summary judgment motion, she wishes respectfully to 
point out that defendant has not been damaged by that ruling. 
All three leases were reviewed at trial, defendant introduced 
evidence on all those leases, and the trial court independently 
concurred in the summary judgment ruling. Defendant has had 
his full day in court on all the issues he raises in his 
summary judgment appeal, and he had that hearing well before 
those leases expired. For this independent reason, plaintiff 
requests affirmance of that ruling below. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ALLOW EVIDENCE 
OF SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES AT TRIAL, 
SO DEFENDkNT'S CONTENTIONS ON 
THAT ISSUE ARE DEVOID OF MERIT. 
Defendant argues vigorously in his final judgment appeal 
brief that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of 
surrounding circumstances which preceded execution of the 
leases at issue here. Defendant's brief at 5, 7-9. As noted 
in the preceeding factual discussion, however, the trial 
court did allow defendant to present all his evidence on such 
surrounding circumstances, a fact which review of the trial 
transcript references cited by the defendant will easily bear 
out, and so this argument by defendant is totally without 
merit. 
It is true that plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of 
surrounding circumstances because the leases are clear and 
unambiguous, but as plaintiff was unsuccessful in seeking to 
exclude that evidence, there is no basis for appeal on that 
issue by the defendant. E.g., R. 256, 275 (overruling plain-
tiff's objections). It is true that defendant was unable to 
introduce much evidence on any such surrounding circumstances, 
but his lack of success in presenting such evidence was simply 
a result of all parties' lack of recollection of those cir-
cumstances, and not of any rulings by the trial court. Even 
defendant himself, who apparently urged the introduction of 
such evidence because he thought it would help his position, 
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was unable to recall any of the negotiations leading to exe-
cution, not only of the current leases signed in 1969, but also 
of the 1953 and 1957 predecessor leases. 
Defendant argues that the leases are ambiguous as to 
whether the renewal provisions in those leases were intended to 
be personal or a covenant running with the land. Defendant's 
final judgment brief at 8. Defendant did not present any 
evidence supporting any position he might have on that ambiguity, 
however, so this again is a matter of which he may not now 
complain. 
Finally, he asserts on appeal that it is unclear whether the 
renewal options we~e to operate only if the land was sold. 
Defendant's final judgment appeal brief at 9. Again, he failed 
to introduce any evidence on that ambiguity, although he did 
argue it to the court below at the end of the trial (R. 299-
300). Since he could present the trial court with no evidence 
on this "ambiguity," this also is a matter on which he can:wt 
now complain. 
In sununary, if defendant was unable to present much evidence 
regarding surrounding circumstances, this was only a result of 
all parties' complete inability to recall those circumstances, 
and was not a result of any exclusion of evidence by the court 
below, for which reason this argument of defendant's is a 
creature of fiction. 
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POINT V 
IF INDEED THERE AP£ ANY AMBIGUITIES 
IN THESE LEASES, THOSE AMBIGUITIES MUST 
BE CONSTRUED AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE 
HE DRAFTED THEM. 
Unrebutted evidence at trial established that Mr. Skeen, 
defendant's counsel herein, drafted the three leases at issue 
in this case, and that at that time he represented the defendant, 
but he did not represent plaintiff's father (R. 258,260). 
Since these leases were drafted by the defendant-lessee, not by 
the lessor, they must be construed against the lessee. 
Defendant asserts several alleged ambiguities in those 
leases on these appeals. He contends that the reference in 
those leases to the "present lessor" is ambiguous, that it is 
unclear whether the renewal option was to run with the land or 
not, that the interrelationship of the renewal option and the 
purchase option in those leases is uncertain, and that an 
ambiguity is created because plaintiff's father "was 92 or 93 
years old in 1969 when the lease was made" (defendant's final 
judgment appeal brief at 7). 
A proposition so fundamental that it does not merit 
citation is that the courts will not rewrite contracts simply 
because the parties might have made themselves a better bar-
gain, particularly where, as in this case, their language 
clearly evidences their intent to enter into precisely such an 
agreement. Again, it is plaintiff's position that these leases 
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are clear and unambiguous and ~hat, because of that clear and 
unambiguous language, defendant was not entitled to renew those 
leases. If this Court should disagree with plaintiff in that 
assertion, however, plaintiff respectfully wishes to point out 
here that any such ambiguities must be resolved in her favor 
and against the defendant, whose representative drafted these 
leases. Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975); 
Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 Utah 2d 212, 507 P.2d 
381 (1973); Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P.2d 548 
(1962). 
Accordingly, even should this Court determine that there 
were any ambiguities in these leases, the rulings below should 
be affirmed nonetheless, as any such ambiguities must be 
resolved against defendant and in favor of plaintiff. 
COl~CLUSION 
The rulings of the court below, both on partial summary 
judgment and on final judgment, were correct and should be 
affirmed by this Court on appeal. ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /1 cav 
---'- " 
of April, 1979. 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LA7IMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT ON BOTH CONSOLIDATED APPEALS was mailed this lttfi 
day of April, 1979, postage prepaid, to E. J. Skeen, of and for 
Skeen & Skeen, 536 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
attorneys for defendant. 
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